The real comparison.
A weekend prototype can upload files. A production trust layer has to prove who authorized the operation, what bytes moved, where they landed, what changed, and how someone else can verify it later.
A managed, per-developer storage agent that handles the full Nukez protocol on your behalf. You send natural language. It handles everything else — envelope construction, upload, attestation, Switchboard oracle push — and returns the receipt.
Looking for the technical reference? /docs/nukezagent →
A weekend prototype can upload files. A production trust layer has to prove who authorized the operation, what bytes moved, where they landed, what changed, and how someone else can verify it later.
Request signing proves who is asking. Envelope signing proves who authorized the operation. Content-hash binding proves the bytes did not change. Those are product guarantees, not implementation chores.
Build and maintain that proof surface yourself, or delegate it to a hosted storage specialist. Your agents describe the task in natural language; NukezAgent returns receipts your team can verify.
┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ 01 · ROUTER │ │ 02 · EXECUTOR│ │ 03 · SUPERV. │
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ Intent router│ │ Deterministic│ │ Background │
│ │ │ executor │ │ supervisor │
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ Classifies │ │ Deterministic│ │ Background. │
│ intent. │ │ execution. │ │ Conversation │
│ ~1s. │ │ Not an LLM. │ │ history. │
│ Stateless. │ │ Pulls bytes, │ │ Surfaces │
│ │ │ hashes, POSTs│ │ anomalies. │
│ │ │ to gateway. │ │ Never on the │
│ │ │ Scope exits │ │ hot path. │
│ │ │ — bytes gone.│ │ │
└──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘
│ │ │
└──────────────────┼──────────────────┘
│
┌──────▼──────┐
│ your data │
│ your key │
│ never ours │
└─────────────┘The supervisor never touches the hot path. The executor is not an LLM. These separations are what make the service deterministic, cheap, and safe.
These four stores are architecturally separated. They cannot be conflated or cross-contaminated. The separation is what the security model rests on.
Scope · HTTP / SDK / MCP / NukezAgent · token-per-operation baseline · measured + sourced · read methodology →
DIY ranges shown are illustrative per-component estimates, not a total. The argument isn't that $500 is cheap — it's that the engineering time you'd spend on any one of these rows costs more than the flat rate replaces all of them.
A specialist contractor. You call them, they handle it, you get the receipt.
They know it exists. They delegate to it. They get results. No tool schemas leak into their context. No envelope signing. No locker semantics. No protocol.
A lead agent of its own domain. It may spawn internal sub-agents for parallel uploads, verification pipelines, locker management. You never see this hierarchy.
This is why the 162 tokens/op number is possible. Zero-footprint is not a marketing claim; it's the architecture.
“In a multi-agent system where agents make decisions based on what other agents told them, verified context is a fundamentally different trust model.”
Mem0, Zep, LangMem — these give your agents a brain. NukezAgent gives your agents a notary. When Agent B receives a message from Agent A through the NukezAgent-managed locker, it comes with cryptographic proof of what was stored, when, and by whom. The agent doesn't just remember — it can prove what it remembered. That's the difference.
you nukezagent
│ │
│ task → /v1/delegate │
├─────────────────────────────▶│
│ │ constructs envelope
│ │ needs signature
│ signing_needed │
│◀─────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ sign locally │
│ (your key, your machine) │
│ │
│ signature │
├─────────────────────────────▶│
│ │ posts signed envelope
│ │ to gateway
│ receipt │
│◀─────────────────────────────┤
│ │The agent constructs what needs to be signed. You sign it. You send the signature back. The agent attaches it and completes the operation. Ed25519 and secp256k1 are equal first-class signing algorithms — use whichever your runtime supports. Your private key never leaves your machine — not to us, not through us, not near us.
curl -X POST https://agent.nukez.xyz/v1/delegate \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Nukez-Identity: ${PUBKEY}" \
-H "X-Nukez-Nonce: ${NONCE_HEX}" \
-H "X-Nukez-Timestamp: ${TIMESTAMP}" \
-H "X-Nukez-Signature: ${REQUEST_SIGNATURE}" \
-d '{"task": "Store report.pdf and tag it Q1"}'Any language with HTTP + Ed25519 or secp256k1 signing. That is every language.
agents:
storage:
role: Persistent storage specialist
endpoint: https://agent.nukez.xyz/v1/delegate
signing_authority: signer
signer:
role: Signing authority
# holds key materialMAZ, CrewAI, AutoGen, LangGraph, or any orchestrator. The sub-agent is a peer, reachable at an HTTP endpoint.
// claude desktop / claude code // lightweight local shim translates // MCP tool calls → /v1/delegate // and handles signing locally
Claude Desktop, Claude Code, or any MCP-native client. Use the shim, or the Nukez MCP server as proxy.
The full integration reference lives at /docs/nukezagent →
GET /v1/service/request
→ 402 Payment Required
{
"price_usd": 500,
"accepts": [{ "extra": { "name": "SOL" },
"amount": "...",
"payTo": "..." }]
}// pay externally with your wallet, then: POST /v1/service/confirm X402-TX: PAYMENT_TX_SIGNATURE X-Nukez-Identity: YOUR_PUBKEY X-Nukez-Nonce: 32_BYTE_RANDOM_HEX X-Nukez-Timestamp: UNIX_SECONDS X-Nukez-Signature: REQUEST_SIGNATURE → 200 OK · subscription active
POST /v1/delegate
X-Nukez-Identity: YOUR_PUBKEY
X-Nukez-Nonce: 32_BYTE_RANDOM_HEX
X-Nukez-Timestamp: UNIX_SECONDS
X-Nukez-Signature: REQUEST_SIGNATURE
{
"task": "Store report.pdf",
"files": [{ "name": "report.pdf",
"data_b64": "…" }]
}
→ 200 OK
+ receipt · merkle_root · attestedOne GCS locker is bundled with the subscription. Additional capacity is quoted through /v1/service/expand at gateway pass-through rates. See the full pricing breakdown →
Ready to delegate? Register your identity, run your signing bridge, and send your first task in under five minutes.